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Ethnic diversity and trust: new evidence from Australian data 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the relationship between neighbourhood ethnic and linguistic heterogeneity and 
individuals' local and generalised trust. A wide literature across economics and sociology has recognised 
the importance of trust in facilitating economic growth and development. We use fixed effects and 
instrumental variable regression and control for a wide set of individual and local area characteristics. Our 
results show that a 1 standard deviation increase in ethnic and linguistic fractionalisation is associated 
with a decrease in local trust of about 0.12 standard deviations, while we do not find any significant 
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This paper investigates the relationship between neighbourhood ethnic and linguistic 
heterogeneity and individual’s local and generalized trust. A wide literature across 
economics and sociology has recognised the importance of trust in facilitating economic 
growth and development. We use fixed effects and instrumental variable regression and 
control for a wide set of individual and local area characteristics. Our results show that a 1 
standard deviation increase in ethnic and linguistic fractionalisation is associated with a 
decrease in local trust of about 12% of a standard deviation, while we do not find any 





Successful functioning of modern society is predicated on the existence of a high degree of 
interpersonal trust among its members. When individuals trust one another they are more 
inclined to cooperate and engage in mutually beneficial exchanges, leading to higher levels 
of economic development (Arrow, 1972). Cross-country comparisons suggest a strong 
positive link between trust and economic growth rate (Knack and Keefer, 1997), per capita 
income (Algan and Cahuc, 2010, 2013) and absence of excessive government regulation 
(Aghion et al 2010, 2011). At a more aggregate level, absence of trust between groups of 
agents is considered to be one of the primary causes of the costly and persistent inter-group 
conflicts that punctuate human history (Acemoglu and Wolitzky, 2014). 
Existing empirical evidence suggests that one of the important determinants of an 
individual’s trust towards other people is the level of ethnic heterogeneity of a community, 
city or country of residence. People living in racially or ethnically mixed areas tend to exhibit 
lower levels of trust compared to those residing in ethnically homogeneous communities. 
This was found to be true for generalized trust (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002; Delhey and 
Newton, 2005), as well as inter-ethnic trust (Putnam, 2007). The literature has also 
documented a negative impact of ethnic and linguistic diversity on various measures of 
social capital, at the country level. (Wang and Steiner, 2015). If true, the negative 
relationship between heterogeneity and social capital has important implications for 
immigration and settlement policies in many countries that experience large inflows of 
migrants. Even though studies from various disciplines have provided evidence showing that 
the economic and social benefits of immigration are remarkable (see for example Johnson, 
1994; Muysken and Ziesemer, 2013; Zelekha, 2013; Fratzscher and Junker, 2015; Ng and 
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Metz, 2015), it is important to consider all possible channels through which immigration 
impacts society. Understanding the full extent of the effect of ethnic heterogeneity on trust 
(and social capital in general) is, therefore, vital for formulating a well-designed immigration 
policy. 
This issue is of particular importance for Australia, which, following the official adoption of a 
multicultural immigration policy, has implemented an expansive immigration program, 
welcoming migrants from many diverse backgrounds (OECD 2006). Since the immediate 
aftermath of the Second World War, the percentage of the Australian population born 
overseas has increased from approximately 9.8% in 1947 to approximately 27.7% at June 30, 
2013 (ABS 2013; Phillips, Klapdor & Simon-Davies 2010). Furthermore, the vast majority of 
overseas born Australian residents in 1947 were born in countries that were ethnically or 
culturally very similar to Australia, with 78.6% of the overseas born population hailing from 
the United Kingdom, Ireland, or New Zealand. In 2011, this figure had fallen to 
approximately 28.9%. Australia’s ethnic diversity has thus increased not only as a result of a 
larger intake of migrants, but also as a result of a more diverse intake. Australian experience 
with immigration policy is unique and quite different from other countries, and notably 
Western European countries. As noted in Castles (1992), there are major differences 
between the migratory experience in Australia and Western Europe, in particular due to 
geographical factors and relative size of the immigrant population, as well as to the role of 
immigration policy based on the ideas of permanent settlement and nation-building in 
Australia.  
This paper studies the relationship between generalized and local or neighborhood level 
trust and ethnic and linguistic heterogeneity in the Australian context. In contrast to the 
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previous literature it uses a longitudinal household survey. This makes it possible to consider 
identification strategies, which were not used in this context previously. It also adds to the 
existing Australian literature on the topic (Bullen and Onyx, 1999; Leigh, 2006) by testing the 
robustness of the results to different identifying assumptions and considering a wider set of 
indicators measuring generalized trust as well as local trust or social capital at the 
neighbourhood level. Our main results largely confirm the earlier set of findings reported in 
Leigh (2006). We find that in the Australian context ethnic and linguistic heterogeneity 
affects negatively local but not generalized trust. This result is robust to the different 
identification assumptions and measures of trust that we use. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews existing literature on trust 
and its relationship with ethnic heterogeneity. Section 3 describes the data used in the 
analysis. Section 4 describes the econometric methodology, Section 5 presents our results 
and Section 6 provides concluding remarks. 
2. Literature review 
Existing literature makes a distinction between two different concepts of trust. First, a 
person can feel varying degrees of trust towards the people that she is acquainted with. This 
notion of trust relies principally on the information available to the person based on the 
experience of interacting with people in her environment. The second notion of trust is 
related to trust towards people in general; a general belief in the moral qualities of a person 
one meets for the first time without necessarily possessing any prior information about 
them. Uslaner (2002) defines the first type of trust as strategic trust. This notion of trust 
involves rational calculation and risk assessment based on the available evidence and it 
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corresponds closely to the concept of trust as envisioned by economic theorists (Dusgupta, 
1988) and which is a subject of experimental literature in economics (Berg et al, 1995).  The 
second concept of trust is defined by Uslaner (2002) as moralistic or generalized trust. It is 
this ethical dimension of the trust that is important in understanding civic engagement and 
social capital more generally.  
Empirical literature (see for example Knack and Keefer, 1997) on generalized trust has used 
some form of trust question similar to the one found in the World Values Survey and the US 
General Social Survey:  “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted 
or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?” The structure of the question 
implies that it applies to people in general, and not those necessarily known to the 
respondent and thus seems to rule out any strategic considerations based on prior 
experience. Even though the question is widely used, some studies have argued that 
generalized trust questions might measure the individual’s trustworthiness rather than their 
attitudes toward other people (Glaeser et al., 2000). This view has however been challenged 
by Fehr et al (2003), who have argued that Glaeser et al (2000) results were likely driven by 
the non-representativeness of their sample.  
A separate strand of the empirical literature has studied a different kind of trust question, in 
which respondents are asked whether they trust people in their neighbourhood (Leigh, 
2006; Sturgis et al, 2011; and Putnam, 2007). Current literature agrees that this type of 
“trust in neighbours” question captures attitudes that are quite different from the 
generalized trust questions discussed above (Uslaner 2002,  Sturgis et al, 2011), and relates 
to the trust in people the respondents are familiar with (Sturgis and Smith, 2010). Overall, 
Sturgis et al (2011) conclude that the trust in neighbors question “appears to be a mix of 
trust in strangers and the more strategic, or ‘thick’ variety of trust in known others.” Despite 
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its more ambiguous interpretation, it seems that the “trust in neighbors” or “local trust” 
question, where available, can serve as a useful comparison point in the studies of the 
determinants of trust, capturing (at least partially) the notion of strategic trust as it is 
understood, in particular, in economics literature. 
Of particular relevance to the current study is the work by Leigh (2006), which investigated 
the determinants of trust with emphasis on ethnic and linguistic heterogeneity using data 
from the 1997-98 Australian Community Survey. The questions used by Leigh (2006) were 
worded as follows: (i) “Generally speaking, you can’t be too careful in dealing with most 
Australians”, and (ii) “Generally speaking, you can’t be too careful in dealing with people in 
my neighborhood”. The first question differs from a typical generalized trust question as it 
explicitly mentions nationality.  It is therefore best thought of as measuring the generalized 
trust prevalent among Australians in that time period. The second question is a typical trust 
in neighbors or local trust question similar to those used by Sturgis et al (2011). After 
instrumenting the ethnic heterogeneity of the neighborhood with ethnic heterogeneity of a 
larger region in which it is contained, Leigh (2006) found that neighborhood level ethnic and 
linguistic heterogeneity affects negatively only local or neighborhood level trust and not 
generalized trust among Australian residents.   
A similar finding was reported later in Sturgis et al. (2001) who used British data and found 
that only local trust (which they contend corresponds to a large extent to the notion of 
strategic trust) is affected by the ethnic heterogeneity. These results are important because 
they provide evidence against the “hunkering down” hypothesis advanced by Putnam 
(2007) who has reported evidence of the community level ethnic heterogeneity having a 
negative impact on intra and inter-ethnic trust in the US. By considering simultaneously 
generalized and local or strategic trust, both Leigh (2006) and Sturgis et al (2011) 
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demonstrate that the latter construct is affected by the ethnic heterogeneity, while the 
former isn‘t.  
This paper builds upon the analysis of Leigh (2006) and extends it in several ways. It uses 
data coming from the 2006 and 2010 waves of the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics 
in Australia (HILDA) survey. The use of HILDA data enables us to analyse a more recent 
period during which Australia continued to experience large inflows of international 
migrants. More importantly, the longitudinal nature of the dataset allows us to control for 
individual fixed effects when estimating the effect of heterogeneity on trust and to compare 
these results to those obtained using cross-sectional methods such as OLS and IV. While the 
fixed effects model itself is not completely free from threats to internal validity in this 
context, we believe that comparison of the results obtained under different identifying 
assumptions provides an important robustness check that increases our confidence in these 
results.  Finally, we take advantage of a richer set of questions available in HILDA that can, in 
our opinion, be interpreted as proxies for generalized and local trust, to test whether our 
results carry over to these alternative measures. 
3. Data 
This paper uses data from the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics of Australia (HILDA) 
survey. The survey is an unbalanced panel with annual waves tracking household income 
and labour force participation variables over time for a representative sample of the 
Australian population. Changes in household composition, and a top-up sample added in the 
eleventh wave, have increased the number of participants over time. In total, 19,914 
individuals were included in the initial wave. As additional people joined the original 
households they were also included in the survey. An additional top-up sample of 2,153 
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households was added to the 2011 wave. The 2011 wave included 29,489 individuals. We 
use information collected at wave 6 and 10 (corresponding to years 2006 and 2010) of the 
HILDA survey, as questions relating to local or neighbourhood trust are only asked in those 
waves. Further, data on the proportion of people from different ethnic groups living in each 
postal code are collected from the Australian Census and this restricts the investigation to 
those years in which the census takes place, or the years immediately before and after. Our 
final sample includes over 20,000 observations from both waves, after excluding all 
individuals missing information on one or more variables of interest.  
3.1 Outcomes 
Our measure of generalized trust is based on the question in which respondents are asked 
to nominate on a scale of 1 – 7 (from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree) the extent to 
which they agree with the following statement: “Generally speaking, most people can be 
trusted”. Note that in contrast to the Australian Community Survey question on generalized 
trust used in Leigh (2006), the question in HILDA does not refer explicitly to any nationality. 
One can argue that this is essentially the same question as the generalized trust question 
found in the World Value Survey (WVS) and the US General Social Survey (GSS), except that 
it omits the second part “or that you can’t be too careful when dealing with others?” 
Another difference is that instead of the binary response option specified in the WVS and 
GSS, the format of the HILDA question allows for trust to be measured on a scale from 1 to 
7, and the magnitude of the effect of certain individual and community characteristics can 
be more accurately ascertained. Despite these minor differences, we believe that, similar to 
the WVS and GSS questions, the HILDA question should be interpreted as corresponding to 
the concept of generalized trust in the sense of Uslaner (2002).   
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Following Leigh (2006) and Sturgis et al (2011) we use a “trust in neighbours” question 
available in HILDA to measure the concept of local or strategic trust. The question is worded 
as follows: “People in this neighbourhood can be trusted” and the range of possible answers 
is represented on a 1-7 scale similarly to the generalized trust question. 
We also make use of the additional questions available in HILDA to supplement our analysis 
related to the trust measures discussed above. It must be noted at the outset that these 
questions were not used in the context of the trust literature and that there exists a 
potential ambiguity as to the exact correspondence between them and the trust concepts 
discussed above. We use them primarily to enrich the analysis by investigating if these new 
variables respond to diversity in ways which are similar to the trust indicators. A reader who 
does not agree with our interpretation of these measures should feel free to draw their own 
conclusions from this subset of the results.      
First, we use three additional questions which can be thought of capturing the belief in the 
moral qualities of other people with whom the respondent is not necessarily familiar, and 
therefore serve as alternative proxies for generalized trust. These questions ask the 
respondents about the extent they agree with the following statements: 
1.  “Most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance.” 
2.  “Most people you meet keep their word.” 
3. “Most people you meet make agreements honestly.” 
It must be acknowledged that the wording of questions 2 and 3 might suggest that they 
refer to the people the respondent deals with on a day to day basis (be referring to the 
“people you meet” rather than people in general) and that these questions might be 
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interpreted to some extent as measuring strategic or calculative trust (Williamson, 2003) 
rather than generalized trust. On the other hand, the empirical results show that 
specifications that use these measures as dependent variables produce similar results to the 
one where the main generalized trust question is used.    
Second, we use three questions related to measures of the social cohesion of the 
neighbourhood in which a respondent resides to supplement the analysis of the local or 
strategic trust. This set of questions is a subset of the questions used by Sampson et al 
(1997) in their study of collective efficacy and neighbourhood level crime. The questions 
that we use in this analysis assess the extent to which an individual agrees to the following 
statements: 
1. “This is a close-knit neighbourhood.” 
2. “People in this neighbourhood generally do not get along.” 
3. “People in this neighbourhood generally do not share the same values.” 
While these measures do not refer to local trust explicitly, they can serve as indirect 
indicators of how neighbourhood level diversity can affect community cohesion and local 
trust. For example, if living in an ethnically mixed neighbourhood has an impact on the 
respondent’s  belief that people in the area do not get along and do not share the same 
values, it is likely that she will exhibit less trust in dealings with her neighbours.  
Table 1 reports sample mean values and standard deviations for the different measures of 
trust. Each of these values falls within a range of 1 to 7. There is a consistent increase in 
levels of trust (or decrease in perception of untrustworthiness) between 2006 and 2010, 
though the magnitude is negligible in some cases. Generalized trust levels are higher than 
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local trust levels. Respondents are more likely to report that they trust other individuals in 
their local area than they are to report that they get along with, or share the same values, 
with other individuals in their local area. 
Table 1 here 
3.2 Ethnic diversity 
In our study, we use community characteristics data from the Australian Census of 
Population and Housing (the ‘Census’). The Census is a survey conducted every five years, 
with the principal purpose of determining the number and characteristics of people and 
dwellings in Australia on census night. For every resident of every postcode there is a record 
of ethnicity based on country of birth and a record of ancestry based on country of parent’s 
birth (ABS, 2006; 2011). An individual is considered to belong to an ancestral group where at 
least one of that individual’s parents was born in that ancestral group’s home country. For 
this reason, an individual can belong to two ancestral groups. The census similarly records a 
‘Language Spoken at Home’ for every individual in every postcode. Following the literature, 
(Leigh 2006; Alesina and La Ferrara 2002) we construct Herfindahl indices of neighbourhood 
fractionalisation based on ethnicity, ancestry, and language spoken at home. These indices 
measure the probability that two randomly drawn individuals from the neighbourhood 
population will have different ethnicities, ancestral backgrounds, and language preferences 
respectively.  
The indices are created according to the following formula: 





Where Sej = Share of ethnic group e in neighbourhood j 
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Where Slj = Share of linguistic group l in neighbourhood j 





Where Saj = Share of ancestral group a in neighbourhood j 
In each case, a fractionalisation index score of 0 would indicate a completely homogeneous 
population, with no ethnic, linguistic or ancestral diversity. An index score of 1 would 
indicate a completely heterogeneous population where each individual member of the 
population belonged to a unique ethnic, linguistic or ancestral group. 
Other measures of fractionalisation used in the literature include the measures proposed by 
La Porta et al (1999) and Desmet et al (2012). Desmet et al (2012) seek to explain the cross-
country differences in political and economic outcomes hypothesising that linguistic 
diversity between languages of a common ancestral origin is different in nature to linguistic 
diversity between languages from differing linguistic branches. The indices used in La Porta 
et al (1999) are more closely related to the ones used in the current study. They use the 
average value of five different indices in their analysis, some of which are, similarly to this 
study, Herfindahl type indices corresponding to the probability that two randomly selected 
individuals belong to the same ethnolinguistic group or speak the same language, and the 
others are proportions of populations that do not speak the official or most widely used 
language. Note however, that the latter indices measure the dominance of a given language 
and not diversity and would therefore not be suitable for the type of analysis undertaken in 
this paper.  
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As expected, the three indices are very highly correlated. The indices for ethnic 
fractionalisation and ancestral fractionalisation have a correlation of 0.9566. However the 
ethnic fractionalisation index has a distribution that more closely approximates a normal 
distribution. Ethnic fractionalisation will therefore be used rather than ancestral 
fractionalisation. Separate regressions will use the linguistic fractionalisation index to verify 
the robustness of our main results. Both ethnic and linguistic indices have potential 
limitations. The ethnic fractionalisation index may overstate the level of diversity by 
applying the same weight of difference to individuals from separate but very similar 
ethnicities (such as individuals from the USA and Canada) to individuals from more markedly 
different backgrounds (such as individuals from Egypt and China, for example). The index of 
linguistic fractionalisation may overcome this issue by effectively grouping similar ethnicities 
with common linguistic heritages. However, the linguistic fractionalisation index can be 
misleading insofar as it does not accurately reflect the average level of English proficiency in 
the neighbourhoods; it only reflects the language primarily spoken at home. Using both 
indices should provide the required robustness. 
The average postcode level neighbourhood in Australia has a population of approximately 
20,000 individuals. The probability of any two randomly selected individuals from the 
average Australian postcode level neighbourhood belonging to the same ethnic group is 
approximately 45%. The mean values and standard deviations remain stable for the ethnic 
fractionalisation and ancestral fractionalisation indices between the 2006 and 2010 
samples, however the average level of linguistic diversity increases by 5.5 percentage points 
between 2006 and 2010, or approximately 20% of the 2006 sample mean.  
3.3 Other explanatory variables 
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We estimate several versions of our main model, progressively increasing the set of 
independent variables. The choice of independent variables follows the literature and 
includes: marital and employment status, education level, region of residence, family 
disposable income, and an index of socio-economic deprivation calculated in HILDA 
(Summerfield et al 2012). Table 2 lists the variables used in the analysis. Our set of control 
variables includes some important characteristics that have been omitted in previous 
studies (Leigh, 2006; Alesina & La Ferrara, 2002; Putnam, 2007), such as whether the 
individual lives in urban or rural area. This is an important control variable that can be 
related with trust and diversity. Urban neighbourhoods are much more likely than rural 
neighbourhoods to be ethnically or linguistically diverse. If it is the case that individuals from 
urban neighbourhoods are also systematically more or less trusting than individuals from 
rural neighbourhoods, then this will be an important source of omitted variable bias in 
previous studies. Lastly, we include information on residential tenure. A higher residential 
tenure should increase familiarity among the individual and the individual’s neighbours, 
thereby increasing trust. 
Table 3 reports some descriptive statistics for the estimation sample. The mean value of the 
variables remains consistent between 2006 and 2010. Approximately one-fifth of the 
sample was born outside of Australia. There is a notable increase in the average household 
disposable income for the sample from 2006 to 2010 (approximately +26%). Further, the 
sample seems to be biased towards middle and upper income neighbourhoods, as only 17% 
or respondents belong to the two lowest deciles of the socio-economic status distribution.  
Table 2 here 
Table 3 here 
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4. Methodology and Estimation 
We start with a simple linear model relating trust to various fractionalisation measures at 
the neighborhood level: 
𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗 =  𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑌𝑗 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑗 + 𝑢𝑖𝑗       (1) 
Where: 
𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗 is the extent to which individual 𝑖 in neighbourhood 𝑗 trusts others, either in a 
broad general sense or in a strict local sense. 
𝑋𝑖 is a vector of the characteristics of individual 𝑖. 
𝑌𝑗 is a vector of the characteristics of neighbourhood 𝑗. 
𝐹𝑗 is a measure of the ethno-linguistic fractionalisation of neighbourhood 𝑗. 
The parameter of interest in the above model is 𝛽3, which provides an estimate of the effect 
of neighbourhood heterogeneity on individual trust level. The neighbourhood is defined as 
the area represented by a single postal code in the Australian Census. A range of 
specifications will be presented so as to separately estimate the effect of neighbourhood 
diversity on generalized trust and on local trust. Alternative measures of neighbourhood 
diversity will be used and the effect of ethnic fractionalisation will be compared to the effect 
of linguistic fractionalisation.  
Estimation by OLS could be biased if we are not controlling for variables that are jointly 
correlated with neighbourhood trust and neighbourhood heterogeneity. Following Leigh 
(2006) and Alesina & La Ferrara (2002), we include a number of individual and 
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neighbourhood level control variables, such as gender, education levels, income levels, and 
neighbourhood socio-economic status, as well as some additional characteristics available in 
HILDA that might have an effect on trust, such as individual cultural background and status 
as a rural or urban resident. This strategy however cannot account for the unobservable 
individual characteristics that are jointly correlated with trust levels and neighbourhood 
diversity. These unobservable characteristics cannot be included as control variables in an 
OLS model and might bias the results.  
One way to overcome the endogeneity bias in this context is to instrument heterogeneity at 
the neighbourhood level with the heterogeneity of a larger region (local statistical area) 
containing that neighbourhood, as was done in Leigh (2006). The validity of this instrument 
is based on the strong assumption that individuals can move between neighbourhoods but 
are constrained to remain within the larger region, as a result of family or workplace ties. 
For this reason, we use IV results as a sensitivity test to confirm the OLS findings and we 
report them only briefly in the results section.  
Finally, to account for individual unobserved traits and characteristics that do not vary over 
time, we control for the individual fixed effects by estimating the following model: 
𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗 =  𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑌𝑗 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑗 + 𝑢𝑖𝑗 +  𝛾𝑖      (2) 
where γi is an individual fixed effect that takes into account time-invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity. The parameter of interest in this model is identified by the changes in the 
diversity of that individual’s neighbourhood. Thus there are two possible sources of 
identification in the model: (i) changes in the ethnic composition of a given neighbourhood 
over time, and (ii) relocation of a given individual between different neighbourhoods. One 
reason to be concerned about this distinction is the possibility of endogenous mobility: 
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decisions to move or stay in a given neighbourhood might be motivated by the preferences 
for ethnic heterogeneity. For example neighbourhood diversity might have a negative effect 
on trust for a relatively small portion of individuals in the population, but those individuals 
are more likely to change neighbourhoods. In this case, if the model is identified by movers, 
the estimates will be valid for that sub-population, but might overstate the average effect 
for the population. On the other hand, stayers might be comprised of individuals who are 
indifferent to the ethnic composition of their neighbourhood. If the identifying variation 
comes from stayers we might expect that the estimates will understate the average effect. 
To further investigate this issue we will estimate the model separately on the sample of 
movers and stayers and compare the results to those obtained in the combined sample. 
Another potential limitation of a fixed effects model in this context concerns time-specific 
shocks. Alesina & La Ferrara (2002) find that shocks or traumatic experiences, such as 
divorce or financial misfortune, negatively affect how trusting an individual is. Since a fixed 
effect model can only eliminate time-invariant characteristics, the presence of random time-
varying shocks can produce biased estimates. If an individual experiences a trust affecting 
shock between the two periods, and the shock coincides with or motivates changes in 
neighbourhood diversity, the model may incorrectly attribute the change in trust to the 
change in neighbourhood diversity. For example a negative income shock might reduce an 
individual’s trust and necessitate a move to a low-income neighbourhood. This might 
generate spurious correlation between trust and diversity if income and diversity are 
negatively correlated at the neighbourhood level. Even though diversity and income are not 
correlated in our sample, and we are able to control for the observable shocks, one might 
still be concerned about the role of unobservable time specific shocks. Mitigating this 
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potential limitation to some degree, Alesina & La Ferrara (2002) find that the effects of such 
shocks typically endure for less than a year, so only shocks occurring close to either survey 
will be likely to have an effect on trust levels, and the chances of these shocks 
simultaneously affecting neighbourhood diversity levels are reasonably low.  
5. Results 
This section presents the main empirical findings of the investigation into the effect of 
neighbourhood heterogeneity on individual trust formation. Results will first be presented 
for the OLS model, followed by the IV and Fixed Effects model. Results discussed in this 
section refer to the pooled sample including the observations from 2006 and 2010. Separate 
results for the two waves are available from the authors on request. 
Table 4 presents the results from the OLS regression with generalized trust as a dependent 
variable and Table 5 presents the results for local trust. In both tables, column 1 shows the 
results with ethnic fractionalisation included as an explanatory variable along with only 
basic individual characteristics. In columns 2 we add variables controlling for individual’s 
educational attainment and residential tenure, along with binary variables capturing the 
relative level of socio-economic disadvantage of the individual’s neighbourhood. In column 
3 this specification is re-estimated including linguistic diversity as the explanatory variable of 
interest in place of ethnic diversity. The estimates of the effect of socio-economic 
disadvantage and educational attainment variables are not presented in the tables for 
reasons of parsimony, but are available on request. In both tables and in all specifications, 
the fractionalisation indices are normalised so that the coefficients represent the marginal 
effect of a one standard deviation increase. Robust standard errors are clustered at 
postcode level.  
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Using the ‘benchmark’ specification including a more comprehensive set of control 
variables, the coefficients on both fractionalisation indices are significant at 1% for local 
trust and at 5% for generalized trust. The relationship between fractionalisation and 
generalized trust is economically trivial. A one standard deviation increase in ethnic 
fractionalisation is associated with a decrease in generalized trust of 0.032 or approximately 
2.4% of a standard deviation. The results for linguistic fractionalisation are similar. On the 
other hand, a one standard deviation increase in ethnic fractionalisation decreases local 
trust by 9% of a standard deviation. A one standard deviation increase in linguistic 
heterogeneity decreases local trust by 0.122, or by 8.7% of a standard deviation. 
Moving from a neighbourhood of complete ethnic homogeneity to a neighbourhood of 
complete ethnic heterogeneity – from an index score of 0 to an index score of 1 – would 
reduce local trust by 60% of a standard deviation.  
Considering some of the other variables of interest, women are shown to have higher levels 
of generalized trust. Generalized trust also slightly decreases with age, and the coefficient of 
age squared indicates that trust is higher at very young and very old ages, and low at 
middle-age. The relative socio-economic status of an individual’s neighbourhood plays a 
large role in determining trust, and individuals from the least disadvantaged decile have 
higher levels of general and local trust than individuals from the most disadvantaged decile. 
Urban residents have significantly lower levels of general and local trust than people living 
in rural areas.  
Indigenous Australians trust on average less than the sample mean (being indigenous 
reduces local trust by about 12% of a standard deviation) and a similar effect is observed for 
migrants (-5% of a standard deviation in local trust). Migrants have less general and local 
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trust than non-migrants. These findings could plausibly be explained by the enduring effect 
of culture on trust levels. 
Algan and Cahuc (2010) find that inherited trust among US immigrants is highly correlated 
with the migrant’s country of birth. Similarly, the endurance of cultural ‘shocks’ such as 
those described by Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) might explain the reduced disposition to 
trust among an Indigenous population subjected to widespread trauma and injustice in 
recent history. It is perhaps not surprising that this effect is more pronounced for 
generalized trust levels than local trust levels. Repeated interaction and familiarity at the 
local level might promote trust within local communities, but overarching cultural norms 
might prevent the formation of higher levels of generalized trust. 
Table 4 here 
Table 5 here 
 
The preferred specification of the model includes many observable variables that might be 
determinants of trust levels such as, for example, the urban binary variable, household 
income, and educational attainment. However it is possible that the effect of 
neighbourhood diversity on trust is introduced by individuals from low trust cultural 
backgrounds. Since migrants are shown to partially retain the cultural norms of their home 
countries (Algan & Cahuc 2010), it is possible that migrants from certain cultural 
backgrounds will have higher or lower levels of trust than the existing population. Migrants 
are more likely to be found in high diversity areas. This might mean that the correlation 
between diversity and trust might not be interpreted causally because the “migrant’ binary 




For this reason, a sensitivity test has been run, where the OLS model is respecified, first to 
include a binary variable for the country of birth of each respondent and then to include an 
indicator of the ‘region’ of birth which allows for greater precision in the estimates where 
some countries are represented by very few respondents. The complete results are 
available on request and are very similar to the ones reported above. We therefore 
conclude that the results do not seem to be driven by the presence of individuals from 
particular backgrounds in more diverse neighbourhoods.  
Further, we have run an additional sensitivity test, by first excluding migrants from our 
sample and then limiting the estimation to migrants only. Results are reported in Table 11 
and, as expected, show that most of the local trust effect is driven by non-migrant 
individuals, while fractionalisation does not seem to have a significant effect on migrants’ 
trust.  
Table 6 and 7 report the results for the sensitivity test using the IV model. The underlying 
identification assumption in this specification is that individuals are more or less constrained 
within larger regions by work, family and social ties and therefore the ethnic 
fractionalisation of a larger region can be used as an instrument for the ethnic or linguistic 
fractionalisation of smaller regions. 
The dependent variables are generalized trust in Table 6, and local trust in Table 7. Column 
3 includes linguistic diversity as the explanatory variable of interest. First stage regression 
results are not presented for reasons of parsimony but are available from the authors on 
request. In all cases, the F test statistic shows that the instrument – ethnic heterogeneity of 
the larger region – is relevant and significant. 
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Table 6 here 
Table 7 here 
The coefficients of interest in the IV model are comparable to those in the OLS model, in 
terms of the direction and significance of the effect on both local and generalized trust. 
Relative to the OLS results for generalized and local trust, the magnitude of the effects is 
slightly larger in the IV model. The results tentatively support the intuition behind the use of 
the instrumental variable regression as argued by Dustmann and Preston (2001): the 
endogeneity of neighbourhood choice possibly results in individuals with a larger aversion to 
heterogeneity systematically sorting themselves into lower-diversity neighbourhoods, 
thereby potentially biasing the OLS regression estimators toward zero, relative to a sample 
in which all individuals are allocated across neighbourhoods on a purely random basis. 
The results from the fixed effects model are presented in Table 8 and this is our preferred 
specification. Columns 1, 2 and 3 report the results from the fixed effects model using 
generalized trust as the dependent variable. The distinction between columns is the same as 
previously reported, with columns 1 and 2 using ethnic fractionalisation and column 3 using 
linguistic fractionalisation as the explanatory variable of interest. Columns 4, 5 and 6 repeat 
the specifications from the previous three columns, using local trust as the dependent 
variable.  
Since the fixed effects model relies on changes in variables from one time period to the next 
one as a source of identifying variation, all variables that are both time-invariant and entity-
invariant, such as gender and migrant status, are omitted from the model. Similarly, 
controlling for time fixed effects by including a binary variable for year 2006 implies that the 
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‘age’ variable is dropped from the model, as the variation in age from one time period to the 
next is perfectly correlated with the variation in time between 2006 and 2010. 
Table 8 here 
Using fixed effects to control for unobservable time and individual characteristics, the effect 
of ethnic or linguistic diversity on generalized trust loses significance. The coefficients on the 
diversity indicators for the three specifications which include generalized trust as the 
dependent variable fall to practically zero. However, even after accounting for the 
unobservable individual characteristics, the effect of neighbourhood ethno-linguistic 
fractionalisation on local trust levels is negative and highly significant. The effect of ethno-
linguistic fractionalisation on local trust in the fixed effects model is approximately 
consistent with the effects reported in the OLS model. One standard deviation increase in 
ethnic diversity leads to a decrease in local trust by 12% of a standard deviation. The effect 
is reduced to 10.7% of a standard deviation where linguistic fractionalisation is the chosen 
measure of neighbourhood heterogeneity. 
For example, a postcode with an index of ethnic fractionalisation equal to 0.81, like 
Lakemba in Sydney (New South Wales), has a predicted average level of local trust of 3.71 
(measured on a range 1-7), while a postcode with a level of ethnic fractionalisation of 0.66 
(for example St Ives in NSW) has a predicted average level of local trust of 4.72.  Similarly, 
the suburb of Footscray in Melbourne (Victoria) has a high level of ethnic fractionalisation 
(average index equal to 0.76) and predicted average local trust equal to 3.68, while Toorak 
(Melbourne, VIC) has a lower level of ethnic fractionalisation (index equal to 0.58) and 
higher level of predicted local trust (4.74). 
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An interesting way to interpret the magnitude of these effects is to analyse them by looking 
at previous studies which discuss the relationship between trust and other important 
economic variables. For example, Knack and Keefer (1997) show that a one standard 
deviation increase in trust determines a change in growth of more than one-half of a 
standard deviation. However, their study refers to the impact of generalized trust, while 
most of the effect of ethnic fractionalisation is found on local trust in the current analysis. 
In interpreting the results of the fixed effects model, it is important to first consider what 
drives the results, and what provides the source of identifying variation. In this case, 
changes in the neighbourhood diversity variable are the result of either an evolution of a 
neighbourhood’s ethnic composition over time, or the result of an individual moving 
between neighbourhoods between the two time periods. To investigate the relative 
importance of the two sources of identification we will run separate regressions on two sub-
samples; the movers and the stayers. If the effect of diversity on trust is systematically 
different for movers relative to stayers, the coefficients estimated for the two distinct 
subsamples should be significantly different. Table 9 presents the results of this analysis. 
Column 1 shows the results for the same fixed effect model estimated in Table 8 (columns 5 
and 6), for ease of comparison. Column 2 repeats the estimation using only the subsample 
of stayers. This has the effect of dropping certain variables from the regression such as the 
urban dummy since the source of identifying variation is lost. Column 3 performs the same 
regression on the subsample of movers only. 
Table 9 here 
The interpretation of results presented in Table 9 is that the fixed effects results are not 
substantially different for those individuals who changed neighbourhoods between the two 
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waves and those who did not. The magnitude and direction of the effect of ethnic 
fractionalisation is consistent with the other estimations. Further, the coefficients from the 
subsample of movers and non-movers are not significantly different from the coefficients 
from the whole sample.  The lower level of significance can be attributed to the relatively 
slow evolution of a neighbourhood’s ethnic fractionalisation in such a short period of time 
which results in a relatively small variation in the fractionalisation index between the two 
censuses. The results are largely mirrored for the effect of linguistic fractionalisation, though 
the estimator in column 2 drops to practically zero. This can again be attributed to a lack of 
precision and estimation power in the data. Unlike the effect of ethnic fractionalisation on 
local trust, the coefficients for linguistic fractionalisation differ between the movers and the 
stayers. The effect is larger for the subsample of movers relative to the whole-of-sample 
effect. This implies that the effect of linguistic diversity effect is driven primarily by movers. 
The magnitude of the effect is as high as 15% of a standard deviation. 
5.1 Alternative measures: generalized trust and neighbourhood coherence  
As discussed above, we also perform the analysis using a set of dependent variables which 
can be thought of as proxies for general belief in the moral standards of other people and 
measures of local neighbourhood level social capital which might impact on the local or 
strategic trust at the neighbourhood level. The results are reported in Table 10. A coefficient 
is reported for the effect of both ethnic and linguistic fractionalisation on each variable. 
Each column represents a different dependent variable as follows.  
1. “Most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance.”  
2.  “Most people you meet keep their word.” 
3. “Most people you meet make agreements honestly.” 
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4. “This is a close-knit neighbourhood.”  
5. “People in this neighbourhood generally do not get along.” 
6. “People in this neighbourhood generally do not share the same values.”  
As explained in section 3.1, we use these alternative questions primarily to enrich the 
analysis by investigating whether these new variables respond to diversity in ways which are 
similar to the trust indicators. The first three questions capture the belief in the moral 
qualities of other people with whom the respondent is not necessarily familiar, and 
therefore can be seen as alternative proxies for generalized trust. 
On the other hand, the last three questions  are related to measures of the social cohesion 
of the neighbourhood in which a respondent resides to supplement the analysis of the local 
or strategic trust. This set of questions is a subset of the questions used by Sampson et al 
(1997). 
Table 10 here 
The results reported in table 10 generally confirm the conclusions drawn from the previous 
models that used the more direct questions regarding trust as the dependent variables. The 
effect of neighbourhood ethnic or linguistic heterogeneity on the first set of variables (1-3) 
is not significantly different from zero. On the other hand, ethnic fractionalisation has a 
significant and consistently negative relationship with perceptions of local community 
togetherness, noting that questions five and six are framed such that a positive coefficient is 
indicative of a negative perception of the neighbourhood. The effect for questions 5 and 6 
are consistent with or slightly larger than the reported effect on local trust, though the 
effect reported under column 4 is noticeably larger. When linguistic fractionalisation is 
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considered as the explanatory variable of interest, a broadly similar story emerges, though 
the effect is lessened by approximately one to one and half percentage points across the 
three neighbourhood level variables.  
6. Conclusion 
This paper has studied the determinants of generalized trust (Uslaner, 2002) and local trust 
in Australia using a variety of econometric techniques and identifying assumptions. The 
results are uniform across practically all specifications and indicate that neighbourhood level 
diversity affects local or strategic trust but has no effect on generalized trust. These results 
are consistent with the findings reported in Leigh (2006) who used Australian survey data 
from the 1990s.  In all specifications, an increase in neighbourhood diversity is associated 
with a decrease in local trust, for both ethnic and linguistic diversity. The estimated effect 
remains consistent when the IV and fixed effects models are used. Neighbourhood ethnic or 
linguistic heterogeneity is among the most important determinants of local trust identified 
in the models.  There is no consistent evidence of the effect of neighbourhood diversity on 
generalized trust. The relationship appears to be significant in some of the OLS 
specifications, however the fixed effects model, using the combined longitudinal sample, 
produces estimates that are not significantly different to zero.  
Results from the fixed effects model (the most credible identification strategy) tend to 
suggest that neighbourhood diversity does not have any significant effect on respondent’s 
beliefs in the moral qualities of people in general as captured by the generalized trust 
question. Overall our results indicate that while the negative effects of ethnic diversity on 
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trust in Australia are relatively limited, there might be a scope for government policies 
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Table 1 – Trust variables 







“Most people would take 
advantage of you” 
3.290 1.715 
“Most people you meet keep 
their word” 
4.699 1.375 
“Most people make agreements 
honestly” 
4.989 1.263 




“People in this neighbourhood 
generally don’t get along” 
  2.682 1.424 
“People in this neighbourhood 
generally don’t share the same 
values” 





   









Post code Individual’s postcode 
Neighbourhood section 
of state 
Urban or Non-Urban (omitted) 
Indigenous Australian 
Status 
Indigenous Australian or Non Indigenous (omitted) 
Age Individual’s age in years at interview 
Gender Female or Male (omitted) 
Employment status Unemployed, Not in the Labour force, Employed (omitted) 
Parental status Parent or never had children (omitted) 
Weekly commuting 
hours 
Average hours per week usually commuting (range 0-30) 
Weekly working hours Average hours per week usually worked (range 0-112) 
Highest educational 
attainment  
Postgraduate qualification; Graduate Diploma or Certificate; Bachelor; Diploma; 
Certificate III or IV, Year 12, Year 11 or lower (omitted) 
Country of birth Binary variable 
Length of residential 
tenure 
Number of years living at current address 
Relative Neighbourhood 
disadvantage 
Decile of index of relative socio-economic disadvantage 
Household income Household financial year disposable income ($10,000 units) 
 
 
Table 3 – Descriptive statistics  
 
 2006 2010 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Age 43.9804 18.2135 44.1425 18.5340 
Female 0.5334 0.4989 0.5223 0.4995 
Aboriginal/Torres Strait Islander 0.0197 0.1389 0.0226 0.1488 
Migrant 0.2041 0.4031 0.1939 0.3954 
Unemployed 0.0332 0.1791 0.0372 0.1892 
Not in Labour Force 0.3235 0.4678 0.3289 0.4698 
Household Income ($) 66,933.94 50,075.57 84,460.05 63,659.50 
Parent 0.6520 0.4764 0.6448 0.4786 
Hours Commuted per Week 2.3240 3.6455 2.5087 3.8367 
Hours Worked per Week 23.4735 21.4474 22.9908 21.0477 
Years at Current Address 9.9678 11.3737 9.9286 11.2380 





Table 4 - OLS Estimation - Dependent Variable: Generally speaking, most people can be 
trusted. 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
    
Ethnic Fractionalisation -0.027* -0.032**  
 (0.014) (0.015)  
Linguistic 
Fractionalisation 
  -0.028** 
(0.014) 
Female 0.078*** 0.059*** 0.059*** 
 (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) 
Age -0.005 -0.009** -0.009** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Age^2 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Indigenous Australian -0.350*** -0.260*** -0.259*** 
 (0.082) (0.081) (0.081) 
Migrant -0.160*** -0.167*** -0.170*** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) 
Unemployed -0.429*** -0.378*** -0.378*** 
 (0.064) (0.063) (0.063) 
Not in Labour Force -0.243*** -0.195*** -0.195*** 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
Parent -0.044 -0.000 0.000 

























Wave 1 (2006) -0.014 -0.029* -0.019 







Urban  -0.087*** -0.095*** 
  (0.030) (0.028) 
    
Observations 21,255 21,255 21,255 
R-squared 0.066 0.087 0.087 
Education Controls NO YES YES 
SES Controls NO YES YES 
Dependent Variable 
Mean 
4.887 4.887 4.887 





Table 5 - OLS Estimation - Dependent Variable: People in this neighbourhood can be 
trusted 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
    
Ethnic Fractionalisation -0.176*** -0.130***  
 (0.019) (0.019)  
Linguistic 
Fractionalisation 
  -0.122*** 
(0.018) 
Female 0.006 -0.009 -0.008 
 (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) 
Age 0.003 0.002 0.002 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Age^2 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Indigenous Australian -0.346*** -0.171** -0.167* 
 (0.087) (0.086) (0.086) 
Migrant -0.100*** -0.077*** -0.086*** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) 
Unemployed -0.298*** -0.212*** -0.212*** 
 (0.071) (0.067) (0.067) 
Not in Labour Force -0.112*** -0.038 -0.037 
 (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) 
Parent 0.035 0.085*** 0.085*** 

























Wave 1 (2006) 0.011 -0.029 0.013 







Urban  -0.281*** -0.305*** 
  (0.038) (0.036) 
Observations 21,255 21,255 21,255 
R-squared 0.078 0.135 0.135 
Education Controls NO YES YES 
SES Controls NO YES YES 
Dependent Variable 
Mean 
4.698 4.698 4.698 
 





Table 6 - IV Estimation - Dependent Variable: Generally speaking, most people can be 
trusted. 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
    
Ethnic Fractionalisation -0.0127 -0.0520**  
 (0.0176) (0.0237)  
Linguistic 
Fractionalisation 
  -0.0657** 
(0.0301) 
    
Female 0.0764*** 0.0586*** 0.0598*** 
 (0.0195) (0.0192) (0.0192) 
Age -0.00409 -0.00808** -0.00806** 
 (0.00350) (0.00355) (0.00355) 
Age^2 0.000241*** 0.000262*** 0.000261*** 
 (3.53e-05) (3.62e-05) (3.62e-05) 
Indigenous Australian -0.323*** -0.233*** -0.233*** 
 (0.0825) (0.0818) (0.0819) 
Migrant -0.168*** -0.160*** -0.158*** 
 (0.0279) (0.0277) (0.0279) 
Unemployed -0.427*** -0.373*** -0.373*** 
 (0.0650) (0.0638) (0.0638) 
Not in Labour Force -0.233*** -0.182*** -0.181*** 
 (0.0362) (0.0354) (0.0354) 
Parent -0.0475 -0.00866 -0.0114 









    








    








    
Wave 1 (2006) -0.00814 -0.0258 -0.00123 







    
Urban  -0.0601 -0.0500 
  (0.0375) (0.0412) 
    
Observations 20,767 20,767 20,767 
R-squared 0.066 0.087 0.087 
Education Controls NO YES YES 
SES Controls NO YES YES 






Table 7 - IV Estimation - Dependent Variable: People in this neighbourhood can be trusted 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
    
Ethnic Fractionalisation -0.147*** -0.150***  
 (0.024) (0.030)  
Linguistic 
Fractionalisation 
  -0.189*** 
(0.039) 
    
Female 0.001 -0.012 -0.009 
 (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) 
Age 0.004 0.003 0.003 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Age^2 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Indigenous Australian -0.337*** -0.165* -0.163* 
 (0.088) (0.086) (0.086) 
Migrant -0.111*** -0.060** -0.057* 
 (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) 
Unemployed -0.300*** -0.209*** -0.210*** 
 (0.072) (0.068) (0.068) 
Not in Labour Force -0.115*** -0.039 -0.035 
 (0.039) (0.037) (0.037) 
Parent 0.034 0.074** 0.066** 









    








    








    
Wave 1 (2006) 0.015 -0.031 0.039 







    
Urban  -0.258*** -0.229*** 
  (0.048) (0.054) 
Observations 20,767 20,767 20,767 
R-squared 0.077 0.135 0.134 
Education Controls NO YES YES 
SES Controls NO YES YES 





Table 8 - Fixed effects estimates – Effect of fractionalisation on local and generalized trust 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Generalized trust Generalized trust Generalized trust Local Trust Local Trust Local Trust 
       
Ethnic Fractionalisation 0.004 -0.003  -0.242*** -0.170***  
 (0.028) (0.033)  (0.031) (0.038)  
Linguistic 
Fractionalisation 
  -0.012 
(0.028) 
  -0.150*** 
(0.033) 
       
Unemployed -0.131 -0.139 -0.139 -0.171* -0.166* -0.163 
 (0.082) (0.087) (0.087) (0.089) (0.100) (0.100) 
Not in Labour Force 0.007 0.003 0.004 0.061 0.042 0.045 
 (0.053) (0.055) (0.055) (0.058) (0.061) (0.061) 
Parent 0.089 0.082 0.081 0.176** 0.167** 0.164** 















       














       

























       
Urban  0.027 0.035  -0.277*** -0.303*** 
  (0.067) (0.064)  (0.086) (0.082) 
Wave 6 -0.083*** -0.089*** -0.085*** -0.070*** -0.090*** -0.039* 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.020) (0.018) (0.018) (0.022) 
       
Observations 15,086 15,086 15,086 15,086 15,086 15,086 
R-squared 0.007 0.010 0.010 0.014 0.043 0.043 
Number of Individuals 7,543 7,543 7,543 7,543 7,543 7,543 
Education Controls NO YES YES NO YES YES 
SES Controls NO YES YES NO YES YES 
Dependent Variable 
Mean 
4.9305 4.9305 4.9305 4.7482 4.7482 4.7482 




Table 9– Fixed effects estimates - Dependent Variable: People in this neighbourhood can 
be trusted 
 (1) Combined (2) Stayers (3) Movers 
Panel A    
Ethnic Frac -0.170*** -0.173**   -0.160*** 
(std. err.) (0.038) (0.088) (0.042) 
Education Controls YES YES YES 
SES Controls YES YES YES 
R squared 0.043 0.022 0.100 
Sample size 15,086 11,388 3,698 
Test stat
#
  0.031 -0.176 
Panel B    
Linguistic Frac -0.150*** 0.0007 -0.206*** 
(std. err.) (0.033) (0.062) (0.039) 
Education Controls YES YES YES 
SES Controls YES YES YES 
R squared 0.043 0.021 0.107 
Sample size 15,086 11,388 3,698 
Test stat
#
  -2.145 1.096 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
# z score for a test of difference between these coefficients and the coefficients reported in column (1) 
 
Table 10 - Fixed Effects Using Alternative Dependent Variables 
 Most people 
would try to 
take advantage 
of you if they 
got a chance 
Most people 
you meet keep 
their word 
Most people 
you meet make 
agreements 
honest 
This is a close-
knit 
neighbourhood 
People in this 
neighbourhood 
generally do not 
get along 
People in this 
neighbourhood 
generally do not 
share the same 
values 
Panel A       
Ethnic Frac -0.033 -0.026 -0.030 -0.283 0.100 0.129 
(std. err.)   (0.040) (0.034) (0.031) (0.041)*** (0.043)** (0.042)*** 
% stand. dev. 1.9% 1.9% 2.4% 19.23% 7.04% 9.1% 
Panel B       
Linguistic Frac -0.027 0.002   -0.035 -0.248 0.064 0.097 
(std. err.)   (0.033) (0.031) (0.027) (0.033)*** (0.036)* (0.036)*** 
% stand. dev. 1.6% 0.15% 2.8% 16.85% 4.5% 6.9% 
Note:  Possible answers range from 1 to 7, where 1 corresponds to “strongly disagree” and 7 corresponds to “strongly agree”. 






Table 11 – Sensitivity test – Effect of fractionalisation on trust by migrant status 
 
No Migrants Only Migrants  
 Generalized trust Local Trust Generalized trust Local Trust 
Ethnic Frac -0.013 -0.183 0.019 -0.125 
(std. err.) (0.035) (0.042)*** (0.090) (0.088) 
Education Controls YES YES YES YES 
SES Controls YES YES YES YES 
Sample size 11,998 11,998 3,088 3,088 
No Migrants Only Migrants 
 Generalized trust Local Trust Generalized trust Local Trust 
Linguistic Frac.   -0.025 -0.200 0.019 0.015 
(std. err.) (0.030) (0.037)*** (0.066) (0.074) 
Education Controls YES YES YES YES 
SES Controls YES YES YES YES 
Sample size 11,998 11,998 3,088 3,088 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
